

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

JANUARY 1, 1944

VOL. X, No. 236—PUBLICATION 2043

Contents

	Page
THE WAR	
Address by the President on Christmas Eve	3
Statement by the President on the Anniversary of the Signing of the Declaration by United Nations . .	7
War and Post-War Problems in the Far East: Address by Joseph C. Grew	8 ✓
Enemy Broadcasts Alleging Recognition by Spain of the Mussolini Regime	20
AMERICAN REPUBLICS	
Resolution Regarding Recognition of New Governments Instituted by Force	20
GENERAL	
New Year Message of the Secretary of State	21
TREATY INFORMATION	
Automotive: Convention on the Regulation of Inter- American Automotive Traffic	22
Military and Naval Missions: Agreement With Iran . .	22
THE DEPARTMENT	
Resignation of Thomas Burke as Chief of Division of International Communications	23
PUBLICATIONS	23



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Published Weekly

By the Bureau of Information

Washington, D. C.

Subscription Price, \$1.00 per Annum in Advance

Single Copies, 15 Cents

Entered as Second-Class Matter, May 1, 1902

Postage Paid at Washington, D. C.

Acceptance for mailing at Special Rate of Postage provided for in Act of October 3, 1917

Authorizes the Department of State to publish this Bulletin

under the Act of October 3, 1917

Postage and Fees Paid

NO

*General
Reprinted by the U. S. Gov't*

The War

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT ON CHRISTMAS EVE¹

[Released to the press by the White House December 24]

I have just returned from extensive journeyings in the region of the Mediterranean and as far as the borders of Russia. I have conferred with the leaders of Britain and Russia and China on military matters of the present—especially on plans for stepping-up our successful attack on our enemies as quickly as possible and from many different points of the compass.

On this Christmas Eve there are over 10 million men in the armed forces of the United States alone. One year ago 1,700,000 were serving overseas. Today, this figure has been more than doubled to 3,800,000 on duty overseas. By next July that number will rise to over 5 million.

That this is truly a World War was demonstrated when arrangements were made with our overseas broadcasting agencies for time to speak today to our soldiers, sailors, marines, and merchant seamen in every part of the world. In fixing the time for the broadcast we took into consideration that at this moment here in the United States, and in the Caribbean and on the northeast coast of South America, it is afternoon. In Alaska and in Hawaii and the mid-Pacific, it is still morning. In Iceland, in Great Britain, in North Africa, in Italy, and the Middle East, it is now evening.

In the Southwest Pacific, in Australia, in China and Burma and India, it is already Christmas Day. We can correctly say that at this moment, in those far eastern parts where Americans are fighting, today is tomorrow.

But everywhere throughout the world—throughout this war which covers the world—there is a special spirit which has warmed our

hearts since our earliest childhood—a spirit which brings us close to our homes, our families, our friends and neighbors—the Christmas spirit of “peace on earth, good-will toward men”.

During the past years of international gangsterism and brutal aggression in Europe and in Asia, our Christmas celebrations have been darkened with apprehension for the future. We have said, “Merry Christmas—Happy New Year”, but we have known in our hearts that the clouds which have hung over our world have prevented us from saying it with full sincerity and conviction.

And even this year, we still have much to face in the way of further suffering and sacrifice and personal tragedy. Our men, who have been through the fierce battles in the Solomons, the Gilberts, Tunisia, and Italy know, from their experience and knowledge of modern war, that many bigger and costlier battles are still to be fought.

But—on Christmas Eve this year—I can say to you that at last we may look forward into the future with real, substantial confidence that, however great the cost, “peace on earth, good-will toward men” can be and will be realized and insured. This year I can say that. Last year I could not do more than express a hope. Today I express a certainty—though the cost may be high and the time may be long.

Within the past year—within the past few weeks—history has been made, and it is far better history for the whole human race than any that we have known, or even dared to hope for, in these tragic times through which we pass.

¹ Broadcast from Hyde Park, N.Y., Dec. 24, 1943.

A great beginning was made in the Moscow conference in October by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden, and our own Mr. Hull. There and then the way was paved for the later meetings.

At Cairo and Tehran we devoted ourselves not only to military matters, we devoted ourselves also to consideration of the future—to plans for the kind of world which alone can justify all the sacrifices of this war.

Of course, as you all know, Mr. Churchill and I have happily met many times before, and we know and understand each other very well. Indeed, Mr. Churchill has become known and beloved by many millions of Americans, and the heartfelt prayers of all of us have been with this great citizen of the world in his recent serious illness.

The Cairo and Tehran conferences, however, gave me my first opportunity to meet the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and Marshal Stalin—and to sit down at the table with these unconquerable men and talk with them face to face. We had planned to talk to each other across the table at Cairo and Tehran; but we soon found that we were all on the same side of the table. We came to the conferences with faith in each other. But we needed the personal contact. And now we have supplemented faith with definite knowledge.

It was well worth traveling thousands of miles over land and sea to bring about this personal meeting, and to gain the heartening assurance that we are absolutely agreed with one another on all the major objectives—and on the military means of obtaining them.

At Cairo, Prime Minister Churchill and I spent four days with the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek. It was the first time that we had had an opportunity to go over the complex situation in the Far East with him personally. We were able not only to settle upon definite military strategy but also to discuss certain long-range principles which we believe can assure peace in the Far East for many generations to come.

Those principles are as simple as they are fundamental. They involve the restoration of stolen property to its rightful owners and the recognition of the rights of millions of people

in the Far East to build up their own forms of self-government without molestation. Essential to all peace and security in the Pacific and in the rest of the world is the permanent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression. Never again must our soldiers and sailors and marines be compelled to fight from island to island as they are fighting so gallantly and so successfully today.

Increasingly powerful forces are now hammering at the Japanese at many points over an enormous arc which curves down through the Pacific from the Aleutians to the jungles of Burma. Our own Army and Navy, our Air Forces, the Australians and New Zealanders, the Dutch, and the British land, air, and sea forces are all forming a band of steel which is closing in on Japan.

On the mainland of Asia, under the Generalissimo's leadership, the Chinese ground and air forces augmented by American air forces are playing a vital part in starting the drive which will push invaders into the sea.

Following out the military decisions at Cairo, General Marshall has just flown around the world and has had conferences with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz—conferences which will spell plenty of bad news for the Japs in the not too far distant future.

I met in the Generalissimo a man of great vision and great courage and remarkably keen understanding of the problems of today and tomorrow. We discussed all the manifold military plans for striking at Japan with decisive force from many directions, and I believe I can say that he returned to Chungking with the positive assurance of total victory over our common enemy. Today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose.

After the Cairo conference, Mr. Churchill and I went by airplane to Tehran. There we met with Marshal Stalin. We talked with complete frankness on every conceivable subject connected with the winning of the war and the establishment of a durable peace after the war.

Within three days of intense and consistently amicable discussions, we agreed on every point

concerned with the launching of a gigantic attack upon Germany.

The Russian Army will continue its stern offensives on Germany's eastern front; the Allied Armies in Italy and Africa will bring relentless pressure on Germany from the south; and now the encirclement will be complete as great American and British forces attack from other points of the compass.

The commander selected to lead the combined attack from these other points is Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. His performances in Africa, Sicily, and Italy have been brilliant. He knows by practical and successful experience the way to coordinate air, sea, and land power. All these will be under his control. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz will command the entire American strategic bombing force operating against Germany.

General Eisenhower gives up his command in the Mediterranean to a British officer whose name is being announced by Mr. Churchill. We now pledge that new commander that our powerful ground, sea, and air forces in the vital Mediterranean area will stand by his side until every objective in that bitter theater is attained.

Both of these new commanders will have American and British subordinate commanders whose names will be announced in a few days.

During the last two days at Tehran, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Churchill, and I looked ahead to the days and months and years which will follow Germany's defeat. We were united in determination that Germany must be stripped of her military might and be given no opportunity within the foreseeable future to regain that might.

The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most certainly emphasize that word "respectable"—for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "master race".

We did discuss international relationships from the point of view of big, broad objectives,

rather than details. But on the basis of what we did discuss, I can say even today that I do not think any insoluble differences will arise among Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.

In these conferences we were concerned with basic principles—principles which involve the security and the welfare and the standard of living of human beings in countries large and small.

To use an American and ungrammatical colloquialism, I may say that I "got along fine" with Marshal Stalin. He is a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I believe he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along well with him and the Russian people—very well indeed.

Britain, Russia, China, and the United States and their Allies represent more than three quarters of the total population of the earth. As long as these four nations with great military power stick together in determination to keep the peace there will be no possibility of an aggressor nation arising to start another world war.

But those four powers must be united with and cooperate with all the freedom-loving peoples of Europe and Asia and Africa and the Americas. The rights of every nation, large or small, must be respected and guarded as jealously as are the rights of every individual within our own republic.

The doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it.

But, at the same time, we are agreed that if force is necessary to keep international peace, international force will be applied—for as long as it may be necessary.

It has been our steady policy—and it is certainly a common-sense policy—that the right of each nation to freedom must be measured by the willingness of that nation to fight for freedom. And today we salute our unseen allies in occupied countries—the underground resistance groups and the armies of liberation. They will

provide potent forces against our enemies, when the day of invasion comes.

Through the development of science the world has become so much smaller that we have had to discard the geographical yardsticks of the past. For instance, through our early history the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were believed to be walls of safety for the United States. Time and distance made it physically possible for us and for the other American republics to obtain and maintain our independence against infinitely stronger powers. Until recently very few people, even military experts, thought that the day could ever come when we might have to defend our Pacific coast against Japanese threats of invasion.

At the outbreak of the first World War relatively few people thought that our ships and shipping would be menaced by German submarines on the high seas or that the German militarists would ever attempt to dominate any nation outside of central Europe.

After the Armistice in 1918, we thought and hoped that the militaristic philosophy of Germany had been crushed; and being full of the milk of human kindness we spent the next 15 years disarming, while the Germans whined so pathetically that the other nations permitted them—and even helped them—to re-arm.

For too many years we lived on pious hopes that aggressor and warlike nations would learn and understand and carry out the doctrine of purely voluntary peace.

The well-intentioned but ill-fated experiments of former years did not work. It is my hope that we will not try them again. No—that is too weak—it is my intention to do all that I humanly can as President and Commander in Chief to see to it that these tragic mistakes shall not be made again.

There have always been cheerful idiots in this country who believed that there would be no more war for us, if everybody in America would only return into their homes and lock their front doors behind them. Assuming that their motives were of the highest, events have shown how unwilling they were to face the facts.

The overwhelming majority of all the people in the world want peace. Most of them are fighting for the attainment of peace—not just a truce, not just an armistice—but peace that is as strongly enforced and as durable as mortal man can make it. If we are willing to fight for peace now, is it not good logic that we should use force if necessary, in the future, to keep the peace?

I believe, and I think I can say, that the other three great nations who are fighting so magnificently to gain peace are in complete agreement that we must be prepared to keep the peace by force. If the people of Germany and Japan are made to realize thoroughly that the world is not going to let them break out again, it is possible, and, I hope, probable, that they will abandon the philosophy of aggression—the belief that they can gain the whole world even at the risk of losing their own souls.

I shall have more to say about the Cairo and Tehran conferences when I make my report to the Congress in about two weeks' time. And, on that occasion, I shall also have a great deal to say about certain conditions here at home.

But today I wish to say that in all my travels, at home and abroad, it is the sight of our soldiers and sailors and their magnificent achievements which have given me the greatest inspiration and the greatest encouragement for the future.

To the members of our armed forces, to their wives, mothers, and fathers, I want to affirm the great faith and confidence we have in General Marshall and Admiral King who direct all our armed might throughout the world. Upon them falls the great responsibility of planning the strategy of determining when and where we shall fight. Both of these men have already gained high places in American history, which will record many evidences of their military genius that cannot be published today.

Some of our men overseas are now spending their third Christmas far from home. To them and to all others overseas or soon to go overseas, I can give assurance that it is the purpose of their Government to win this war and to bring them home at the earliest possible date.

And we here in the United States had better be sure that when our soldiers and sailors do come home they will find an America in which they are given full opportunities for education, rehabilitation, social security, employment, and business enterprise under the free American system—and that they will find a Government which, by their votes as American citizens, they have had a full share in electing.

The American people have had every reason to know that this is a tough, destructive war. On my trip abroad, I talked with many military men who had faced our enemies in the field. These hard-headed realists testify to the strength and skill and resourcefulness of the enemy generals and men whom we must beat before final victory is won. The war is now reaching the stage where we shall have to look forward to large casualty lists—dead, wounded, and missing.

War entails just that. There is no easy road to victory. And the end is not yet in sight.

I have been back only for a week. It is fair that I should tell you my impression. I think I see a tendency in some of our people here to assume a quick ending of the war—that we have already gained the victory. And, perhaps as a result of this false reasoning, I think I discern an effort to resume or even encourage an outbreak of partisan thinking and talking. I hope I am wrong. For, surely, our first and foremost tasks are all concerned with winning the war and winning a just peace that will last for generations.

The massive offensives which are in the making—both in Europe and the Far East—will require every ounce of energy and fortitude that we and our Allies can summon on the fighting fronts and in all the workshops at home. As I have said before, you cannot order up a great attack on a Monday and demand that it be delivered on Saturday.

Less than a month ago I flew in a big Army transport plane over the little town of Bethlehem, in Palestine.

Tonight, on Christmas Eve, all men and women everywhere who love Christmas are

thinking of that ancient town and of the star of faith that shone there more than 19 centuries ago.

American boys are fighting today in snow-covered mountains, in malarial jungles, and on blazing deserts; they are fighting on the far stretches of the sea and above the clouds; and the thing for which they struggle is best symbolized by the message that came out of Bethlehem.

On behalf of the American people—your own people—I send this Christmas message to you who are in our armed forces:

In our hearts are prayers for you and for all your comrades-in-arms who fight to rid the world of evil.

We ask God's blessing upon you—upon your fathers and mothers, wives and children—all your loved ones at home.

We ask that the comfort of God's grace shall be granted to those who are sick and wounded, and to those who are prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy, waiting for the day when they will again be free.

And we ask that God receive and cherish those who have given their lives, and that He keep them in honor and in the grateful memory of their countrymen forever.

God bless all of you who fight our battles on this Christmas Eve.

God bless us all. God keep us strong in our faith that we fight for a better day for humankind—here and everywhere.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS

[Released to the press by the White House January 1]

Many of us in the United States are observing this first day of the New Year as a day of prayer and reflection and are considering the deeper issues which affect us as part of the family of nations at a crucial moment in history. It is fitting on this day that we direct our thoughts to the concept of the United Nations

which came into being on another and infinitely bleaker New Year's Day two years ago.

It was but three weeks after Pearl Harbor that the Declaration by United Nations was promulgated at Washington. Twenty-six nations subscribed immediately, eight more have adhered subsequently, all pledging themselves to stand together in the struggle against common enemies.

Two years ago the United Nations were on the defensive in every part of the world. Today we are on the offensive. The walls are closing in remorselessly on our enemies. Our armed forces are gathering for new and greater assaults which will bring about the downfall of the Axis aggressors.

The United Nations are giving attention also

to the different kind of struggle which must follow the military phase, the struggle against disease, malnutrition, unemployment, and many other forms of economic and social distress.

To make all of us secure against future aggression and to open the way for enhanced well-being of nations and individuals everywhere, we must maintain in the peace to come the mutually beneficial cooperation we have achieved in war. On the threshold of the New Year, as we look toward the tremendous tasks ahead, let us pledge ourselves that this cooperation shall continue both for winning the final victory on the battlefield and for establishing an international organization of all peace-loving nations to maintain peace and security in generations to come.

WAR AND POST-WAR PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST

Address by Joseph C. Grew¹

[Released to the press December 29]

Among the many invitations to speak which come to me from all over the country, I know of none that I accepted more promptly and gladly than the invitation to meet tonight the members of the Illinois Education Association, even though it meant coming from Washington for this single engagement. For in fighting the war and in approaching the eventual problems of the peace tables, we need—as perhaps never before so urgently—the development of an enlightened public opinion, especially among the youth of our country—the younger generation in whose hands will largely lie the shaping of our future world. To whom therefore shall we turn rather than to the teachers of our young men and women to guide their thinking broadly and wisely so that the coming generation may be fitted effectively to influence or to deal directly with the solution of the tremendous problems that will face them on emerging from their scholastic years and crossing the threshold into life? The duties, the responsibilities, and the

opportunities that you yourselves face in inculcating that training, my friends of the Illinois Education Association, are of immense importance, and I therefore heartily welcome this occasion which permits me to speak to you tonight. As for the opportunities, it may do no harm to remember the difference between a pessimist and an optimist: a pessimist is one who sees a difficulty in every opportunity, while an optimist is one who sees an opportunity in every difficulty.

Some six weeks ago we passed an anniversary of solemn and significant memory, the Armistice of 1918. How well I remember that day in Paris! Guns booming, bells pealing, the people of Paris in the streets singing and dancing, laughing and weeping. The war to end wars

¹ Delivered at the annual banquet celebrating the 90th anniversary of the Illinois Education Association, Chicago, Dec. 29, 1943. Mr. Grew, former American Ambassador to Japan, is now Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

was over. Thenceforth we were to emerge from battle to a bright new world, a world of peace on earth, good-will toward men. And then, what happened? We in America and people elsewhere quite simply got into bed and pulled the covers over our heads, unwilling to see what was going on about us, asleep to actualities. And now, once again the world is drenched in blood.

Shall we make that grim mistake again? I do not believe so. Human nature may not change much through the ages, but at least mankind learns something from experience, and I believe that we in our country have learned that in this modern world of ours—in which the nations, through developments in communications and transit, have been drawn into inevitable intimacy—isolation has become an anachronism. We cannot kill the seeds of war, for they are buried deep in human nature. But what we can do and I am convinced we shall do is precisely what we did in permanently stamping out yellow fever from our country—remove the conditions under which those seeds of war can germinate anywhere in the world. It can be done and it must be done.

The guilty leaders among our enemies and those individuals responsible for the barbarous acts of crime and senseless cruelties that have been committed under the cloak of war must and shall be punished, and just retribution must and shall be meted out to the enemy countries so that the people of those countries shall be forever cured of the illusion that aggression pays. Their false philosophy can never be discredited until the results are brought home to them in defeat, humiliation, and bitter loss. Measures must and shall be taken to prevent that cancer of aggressive militarism from digging in underground, once again to rear itself in malignant evil and once again to overrun the world, calling upon our sons and grandsons to fight this dreadful war over again in the next generation. Let us assure our defenders on the battle-fronts that this time their heroism shall forever finish the job begun in 1914.

But those self-evident measures will not be

enough. In approaching the eventual peace tables, we shall need the highest qualities of far-sighted statesmanship. We must abandon all promptings of vindictiveness or of pride and prejudice.

First we must clear away the poisonous growth in order to lay the foundations for the erection of an invulnerable and enduring world edifice. Two great cornerstones for that foundation have already been swung into place. One was the Atlantic Charter; the second was the Moscow agreement supplemented and strengthened by the declarations of Cairo and Tehran. Others will follow.

And then we must build. Re-education in certain areas will become essential. I visualize a helpful, cooperative, common-sense spirit in conducting that system of re-education, devoid of browbeating or vindictiveness, with emphasis upon what our enemies will have to gain by playing the game with the rest of the world and what they would lose by recalcitrance. The healthy growth must ultimately come from within. When our enemies find that in cooperation lies their only hope of salvation, they will cooperate. Weariness of the sufferings of war will work in our favor. We do not want festering sores anywhere in our future world for the building of which we and our Allies are fighting and striving today. We do not want the nursing of grudges, rebelliousness and bitterness. We want the people of the world, including our present enemies, to look forward, not back, and to look forward not to the day when they can achieve revenge but forward to a peaceful, lawful, cooperative, solvent, productive, and prosperous national and international life, purged forever of the poison of aggressive militarism. That should be our aim. That should be the ultimate goal of far-sighted statesmanship, and that should be the guiding spirit at the peace tables. We shall need the wisdom of Solomon in approaching those eventual problems. Pray God that we may find it.

Thus may our defenders on the battle lines know that they are not fighting or dying in vain. Thus may they know that we on the

home-front are not only with joyful determination supporting them through the war until total victory is achieved, but that we pledge to them our inexorable determination to carry that support into the post-war world, where the final monument to their heroism shall be the creation of a permanent international structure based on the principles of law, truth, liberty, justice, and peace.

Now, having always in mind those landmarks which I feel should guide our general course in the post-war world, I should like to turn to our war with Japan and its eventual aftermath. In moving around the country, as I have done more or less continually since returning to the United States from Japan some 16 months ago, I have found among our people a great deal of muddled thinking on those problems, which arises largely from an inadequate grasp of facts.

First, with regard to the war itself, there seems to me to be a general tendency to underestimate the difficulties, the length of time, and the potential losses that we face in bringing Japan to eventual unconditional surrender. Over-optimism is not likely to further our steadily strengthening war effort, and I have conceived it as my own best contribution to our war effort to try to overcome in some small degree that dangerously complacent if not wishful thinking among our people. I have already spoken so often on this subject that I shall not try your patience by harping upon it tonight, but I think we all ought to bear in mind certain palpable facts, namely, that the Japanese are fanatical, do-or-die fighters and no mean fighters while still alive; that they control today tremendous areas with all the raw materials and all the native labor for processing those materials that any country could desire; that they are hard-working, pertinacious, foresighted, thorough, and scientific in their methods, and will let no grass grow under their feet in rendering those far-flung areas—through the building of industries, warplants, and stockpiles—so far as possible economically and militarily self-sustaining, against the day when by crippling their maritime transport system we shall have

partially or wholly cut them off from their homeland. At a given moment, with defeat staring them in the face, their leaders are more than likely to try to get us into an inconclusive peace, but that is something that we must never under any circumstances be lured into accepting. The show-down must be complete and irrevocable if we are to avoid another war in the Pacific in the next generation. Surveying that war problem from the most pessimistic angle, I can therefore conceive of a situation where even after we had crippled or destroyed their cities, their navy, their transport shipping, and their air power, even after we had invaded the Japanese homeland, the Japanese forces in those vast occupied areas might continue to fight to the last cartridge and the last soldier. I do not believe that this will happen, but I do believe that our people had better visualize what *might* happen and that we had better foresee the possible worst so that we shall not for a moment relax our maximum war effort. We shall have to fight, I fear, for a long time to come.

Now let us turn to some of the post-war problems that we shall inevitably have to face when once the Japanese *have* been brought to unconditional surrender or at least to a situation when they can fight no further. Here again there is much obscure thinking in our country arising from an inadequate grasp of facts, which has brought about a deep-rooted prejudice against the Japanese people as a whole. In the light of Pearl Harbor, the Attila-like aggressions, and the senseless cruelties of the Japanese military, that prejudice is perfectly natural. I remember that in the last war a similar prejudice and suspicion extended even to Americans with German names, and many people with German names changed them. That blind prejudice against the German race fortunately does not exist today. Although this subject is controversial, most of our people feel that we are chiefly fighting the Nazis and the militaristic caste and cult and doctrine in Germany and not the Germans as a whole. But today comparatively few of our people are able or willing to

admit that there can be anything good in Japan or any good elements in the Japanese race. The prejudice is all-embracing.

Not long ago after one of my talks somewhere in the South, after I had tried to paint a fair and carefully balanced picture of the Japanese people as I know them, a prominent businessman, with whom I had discussed the subject at dinner, came up to me and said: "That was a very interesting talk you gave tonight." I said, "Thank you." "But", he added, "you haven't changed my opinion in the slightest. The only good Jap is a dead Jap." I asked: "Have you ever lived in Japan?" "No", he replied, "but I know that they are all a barbarous, tricky, brutal mass that we can have no truck with, ever again." That sort of attitude I have frequently encountered. It is wide-spread in our country, and through the force of public opinion it can have a serious influence against an intelligent and practical solution of some of the complicated problems we shall have to face in the Far East when the war is over through the destruction of Japan's military machine.

You can't live among a people for 10 years without coming to know them—all classes of them—fairly well. Heaven knows that I should be the last person in our country to hold a brief for any Japanese, for not only have I closely watched that cancer of Japanese aggressive militarism, chauvinism, truculence, vain-gloriousness, and over-weening ambition grow throughout those 10 years, but I have known by first-hand intimate reports of the medieval barbarity of those militarists—the rape of Nanking, which will forever and ineradicably stain Japan's escutcheon in the records of history; the utterly ruthless destruction by bombing of innocent and undefended cities, towns, and villages in China and of our own religious missions throughout China—for the purpose of stamping out American interests and Christianity from all of East Asia—and finally of the indescribable treatment inflicted alike upon helpless Chinese, British, and Canadian prisoners-of-war and upon many of our own American citizens subsequent to Pearl Harbor. Those things one can

never forget or ever forgive. The guilty will in due course be brought to the bar of justice and duly punished, but no punishment under our civilized code can ever repay what has been wrought or wipe out the memory of those utterly barbarous crimes. It would be very easy for me, with my background of many days of bitter experience and many sleepless nights of bitter memory, to assimilate my own thinking with that of the mass of our compatriots who can see no good among the Japanese.

Yet we Americans are generally fair-minded. We are not prone to condemn the innocent because they are helplessly associated with the guilty. I have said that you can't live for 10 years in a country without coming to know all classes of the people of that country, their problems, their predilections, and, in some measure, their trends of thought. Even in our own country we have our Dillingers and our reputable citizens residing in the same street. The main difference is that in our country it is the reputable citizens who control. In Japan it is the military gangsters who control. Only a few years before Pearl Harbor a prominent Japanese said to me: "If our military leaders continue to follow their present course, they will wreck the country."

Throughout those 10 years I was in touch with people in Japan from the highest to the lowest, from the Emperor and his statesmen to the servants in our house, the academic world, the businessmen, the professionals, the tradespeople, and the gardeners on our place. I was never taken in by the often-expressed opinion that a great mass of liberal thought in Japan was just beneath the surface, ready, with a little encouragement from the United States, to emerge and to take control. I knew the power of the stranglehold of the militarists, only awaiting the day when they should find the moment ripe to put into operation their dreams of world conquest. But I also knew that many of the highest statesmen of Japan, including the Emperor himself, were laboring earnestly but futilely to control the military in order to avoid war with the United States and Great Britain,

and I did know that many of the rank and file of the Japanese people were simply like sheep, helplessly following where they were led.

There is no extenuation implied in that statement. It is simply a statement of fact. There of course arises the question as to what effect the impact of the war and the inculcation by the military leaders of the doctrine of hatred against the democracies may have altered the attitude and thinking of the rank and file of the people of Japan since Pearl Harbor. That question cannot with certainty be answered, especially in view of the activities of the "Thought Control" section of the Japanese police who are always searching out what they call "dangerous thoughts". Those in Japan who deplore the war and who cherish no inherent hatred against the white man must be and are inarticulate. Besides, all Japanese are fundamentally loyal to the Emperor at least in spirit, and since the Emperor, after the militarist *fait accompli* of Pearl Harbor, was obliged, willy-nilly, to sign an Imperial Rescript declaring war and calling for the destruction of the United States and Great Britain, very few Japanese would allow their thoughts to run counter to that edict. The Japanese people, under the Emperor, are unquestionably more united in thought and spirit than are the Germans under Hitler.

Yet I repeat that the Japanese rank and file are somewhat like sheep and malleable under the impact of new circumstances and new conditions. I will tell you two short stories—true stories in my own experience—which I think tend to illustrate what I have just said.

On December 12, 1937 the United States ship *Panay* was bombed and sunk in the Yangtze River near Nanking by Japanese planes. From the facts, there could be no question but that the act was deliberate, carried out by Japanese fliers for the very same purpose that had led them to bomb and destroy many of our American religious missions—churches, hospitals, schools, residences—in various parts of China. That purpose was to drive all American interests out of East Asia. After sinking our naval

ship, the planes returned and machine-gunned the officers and men who had taken refuge in the high reeds on the shore, in an endeavor to wipe them out. You no doubt remember what happened after that incident. The Japanese Government did not want war with the United States; perhaps the Japanese Army and Navy did not yet feel prepared for war with us at that time. At any rate, the Government abjectly apologized for what they alleged was an accident—as they had apologized in so many previous cases—met all of our demands, and promptly paid the full indemnity we asked. The incident was closed.

But then the Japanese people had their say. They were ashamed. From all over Japan, from people in high places down to schoolboys, from professors in the universities to taxi drivers and the corner grocer, I received letters of profound apology and regret for the incident. Gifts of money poured in to the Embassy—for that is the Japanese way of expressing sympathy; considerable sums from those who were well off, a few cents from groups of schoolboys. Suggestions were received from home that I return the money, but the money could not be returned, first because it would have been an insult to refuse to accept the gifts in the spirit in which they were given, and second because many of the donations were received anonymously. The money was placed in a "*Panay* Fund" and invested, and the income was to be used for the upkeep of the graves of American sailors who had died in Japan.

But the most touching incident of that wholly spontaneous expression of friendship for the American people by many elements of the people of Japan was when a young Japanese woman came into my office and asked my secretary for a pair of scissors. The scissors were handed to her; she let down her beautiful long hair, cut it off to the neck, wrapped her hair in a parcel, and, taking a carnation from her head, placed it on the parcel and handed the parcel to my secretary with the words: "Please give this to the Ambassador. It is my apology for the sinking of the *Panay*."

Those people did not want war with the United States.

Another little story, not important, perhaps, but still significant. During the early stages of the war, while we in the Embassy were still interned in Tokyo, the Japanese military police occasionally arranged demonstrations in front of our Embassy, and on the day of the fall of Singapore, while Tokyo was celebrating with processions and brass bands, the police gathered several hundred Japanese—from the streets, the shops, and the homes—and brought them down to the square in front of our office to demonstrate. They pressed close to the bars of the Embassy fence behind which we were caged, waving Japanese flags and howling like a pack of angry wolves. "Down with the United States", they shouted. It was a really terrifying sight, and for a moment I almost feared that they might get over the wall and run amuck in the Embassy compound.

At the height of this demonstration, a member of my staff, who was standing on a balcony overlooking that howling pack of wolves, pulled out his pocket handkerchief and cheerfully waved it at the demonstrators. The Japanese were of course astonished at this unexpected gesture. Their jaws fell open in surprise, and for a moment they ceased their howling. But the member of my staff kept right on, blithely waving his handkerchief. And then, wonder of wonders, those Japanese laughed and pulled out *their* handkerchiefs and waved back in most friendly spirit. The police of course were furious; they dashed around trying to stop the unexpected form their carefully regimented hostile demonstration had taken, but nothing could be done, and that whole pack of erstwhile snarling wolves went off up the street, still heartily laughing.

I submit that little anecdote merely by way of concrete evidence to support my belief, indeed my knowledge, that the Japanese people as a whole are somewhat like sheep, easily led and malleable under the impact of new circumstances and new direction. They have followed false gods. They have been and are helpless and in-

articulate under their gangster leadership. And when once the false philosophy of those leaders comes back to the Japanese people in defeat, humiliation, and bitter loss, they themselves, I confidently believe, will be their own liberators from the illusion that military gangsterism pays.

It is my belief—a belief not subject to proof but based on my long experience among the Japanese people—that when once the Japanese military machine—that machine which the Japanese people have been told is undefeatable, having never yet lost a war and being allegedly protected by their sun goddess and by the "august virtues" of the Emperor—has been defeated, largely destroyed and rendered impotent to fight further, it will lose one of the most important of oriental assets—namely "face"—and will become discredited throughout the length and breadth of the land. It is furthermore my belief that if at the time of the eventual armistice or at the eventual peace table—while putting into effect every measure necessary, effectively to prevent that cancer of militarism from digging underground with the intention of secretly building itself up again as it did in Germany—we offer the Japanese people hope for the future, many elements of the rank and file of the Japanese will give a sigh of relief that the war is over and will—perhaps sullenly at first but not the less effectively—cooperate with us in building a new and healthy edifice. This concept also is not subject to proof, but from my knowledge of the Japanese it seems to me to be a fair postulate.

The Japanese people have suffered acutely; they are going to suffer a great deal more acutely for a long time to come. They will see their shipping destroyed and their cities bombed; they will lack adequate food and fuel and clothing; their standard of living will steadily deteriorate; their military police will outdo the Gestapo in cruelties, and when the reckoning comes, the Japanese people will learn of the preposterous lies and of the baseless claims of continual victories over their enemies with which they are daily fed by their military leaders. Even their hardened fanat-

icism—even their last-ditch, do-or-die philosophy—can hardly withstand such an impact. I saw obvious signs of weariness of war among the Japanese people even during the unsuccessful campaign against heroic China between 1937 and 1941. How much greater will that weariness of war become in the years ahead!

That leads us to the problems of the eventual peace settlement with Japan. In approaching this subject I must make perfectly clear the fact that I am speaking solely for myself and that although an officer of the Government I am presuming in no respect to reflect the official views of the Government. Those official views, so far as I am aware, have not yet crystallized. With so many still imponderable factors in the situation I do not see how they could yet crystallize. Studies, of course, are constantly being pursued with regard to post-war problems, and I do not doubt that those studies will lead to a variety of opinions as to the treatment that should eventually be accorded to the enemy nations. In any group of men, in official or unofficial life, it is inconceivable that views and opinions should be unanimous. In the last analysis it is of course the President and the Secretary of State, in conference with the leaders of other members of the United Nations, and with due regard to the views of the American people as expressed by the Congress, who will determine and formulate our own course. With regard to Japan it is therefore of the highest importance that the American people—woefully uninformed as most of them are with regard to Japan and the Japanese—should be enlightened in their thinking not by armchair theorists but by those who know the subject by first-hand experience, by those who have lived long in Japan. The approach to the peace table should be guided by those who intimately know the Japanese people and should be formulated on a basis of plain, practical common sense, without pride or prejudice, or the vindictiveness which is inherent in human nature—formulated with the paramount objective of insuring the future peace and security of the Pacific area and of all the countries contiguous

thereto. Seldom if ever will the United States be called upon, in conjunction with allied nations, to face and to deal with a problem of more momentous import to the future welfare of our country and of the world.

I spoke a moment ago of armchair theorists, and this reminds me of a story told by an American businessman who had lived in Japan, representing a prominent American firm, for some 40 years. During my stay in Tokyo he was called home by his company for consultation. The president and vice presidents of the firm were gathered around the table. "Now, Mr. So-and-so", said the president, "please tell us what Japan is going to do." "I don't know", replied the agent. "What?" thundered the president; "After we have paid your salary for 40 years to represent us in Japan, you have the face to tell us you don't know?" "No," said the agent, "I don't know. But ask any of the tourists; they'll tell you." That anecdote, which was confirmed to me a few days ago by the businessman under reference as substantially correct, is more significant than it may seem. Many Americans visit Japan for a few days or weeks or months and come home and write articles or books about the Japanese. But they haven't got to first base in understanding Japanese mentality. The Japanese dress like us and in many respects they live and act like us, especially in their modern business and industrial life. But they don't think as we do, and nothing can be more misleading than to try to measure by Western yardsticks the thinking processes and sense of rationality and logic of the average Japanese and his reaction to any given set of circumstances. We have armchair statesmen galore; we have volumes galore written by Americans who have spent a few weeks or months, or even a year or two, in Japan, yet whose diagnoses and assessments of Japanese mentality and psychology are dangerously misleading. Many of them have observed Japan and the Japanese solely from the vantage point of that international hostelry, the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. We who have lived in Japan for 10 or 20 or even 40 years know at least how

comparatively little we really do know of the thinking processes of the Japanese. But we are at least in a better position to gage those processes and their results than are the "armchair statesmen".

First of all, I know that there are among us today those who advocate building a fence about Japan and leaving her—I have heard the phrase used in that connection—"to stew in her own juice". The thought has been expressed that during the period of her existence as a world power Japan, through the competition of her export trade and her military aggressiveness, has proved to be more of a nuisance and a handicap in world affairs than an asset. Control of Japanese imports, it is said, could be relied upon to prevent rearmament in future.

With regard to the competition of her export trade having been a nuisance, I might merely inquire whether our cotton exporters and our silk importers would share that opinion. In any case, it is open to question whether we should use our military victory to destroy the legitimate and peace commerce of a commercial competitor and thus betray the principles of the Atlantic Charter. As for the nuisance of Japan's military aggressiveness, it is my assumption that our primary and fundamental objective in the eventual post-war settlement with Japan will be the total and permanent elimination of that military cancer from the body politic of Japan.

I myself do not doubt that this major operation can and will be successfully performed and that effective measures can and will be taken to prevent the re-growth of that cancer in future. Otherwise we shall have fought Japan in vain. In any future system of re-education in Japan I visualize, as I have said, a helpful, cooperative, common-sense spirit, devoid of browbeating or vindictiveness, with emphasis laid upon what the Japanese would have to gain by playing the game with the rest of the world and what they would have to lose by recalcitrance. It was always my regret that these things were not more forcibly brought before the Japanese people in the years before Pearl Harbor. I myself did everything in my power in that

direction, but I was a voice crying in the wilderness. The Japanese people were told by the propaganda of their leaders that the United States and Great Britain were crowding them to the wall, intent upon grabbing control of East Asia and cutting Japan off from the raw materials which she needed for her very existence. At times some of the highest Japanese liberal statesmen did everything in their power, even at the constant risk of assassination by the fire-eaters, to bring their country back to a reputable international life, but they failed. That is all water over the dam now. Now we must look to the future.

The question of determining what kind and how much of Japan's industrial equipment should be left to her after the war will require systematic study. The United Nations must be in a position to determine the factories and machinery necessary for the maintenance of a peace economy, and to dispose of the balance as they think wise—through the dismantling of arsenals and dockyards and of heavy industries designed for or capable of the manufacture of implements of war.

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill conferring at Cairo in November of this year declared that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China", adding: "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." The three Chiefs of State also declared that the "three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." And along with these measures, I visualize a grim determination that the Japanese shall make some sort of amends to China and to other countries for the unspeakable acts of brigandage and the barbarous cruelties inflicted upon the innocent people of those countries.

Now to return to the theory that a fence should be built around Japan and that the Japanese should be left "to stew in their own juice". I cannot see any signs of high statesmanship

icism—even their last-ditch, do-or-die philosophy—can hardly withstand such an impact. I saw obvious signs of weariness of war among the Japanese people even during the unsuccessful campaign against heroic China between 1937 and 1941. How much greater will that weariness of war become in the years ahead!

That leads us to the problems of the eventual peace settlement with Japan. In approaching this subject I must make perfectly clear the fact that I am speaking solely for myself and that although an officer of the Government I am presuming in no respect to reflect the official views of the Government. Those official views, so far as I am aware, have not yet crystallized. With so many still imponderable factors in the situation I do not see how they could yet crystallize. Studies, of course, are constantly being pursued with regard to post-war problems, and I do not doubt that those studies will lead to a variety of opinions as to the treatment that should eventually be accorded to the enemy nations. In any group of men, in official or unofficial life, it is inconceivable that views and opinions should be unanimous. In the last analysis it is of course the President and the Secretary of State, in conference with the leaders of other members of the United Nations, and with due regard to the views of the American people as expressed by the Congress, who will determine and formulate our own course. With regard to Japan it is therefore of the highest importance that the American people—woefully uninformed as most of them are with regard to Japan and the Japanese—should be enlightened in their thinking not by armchair theorists but by those who know the subject by first-hand experience, by those who have lived long in Japan. The approach to the peace table should be guided by those who intimately know the Japanese people and should be formulated on a basis of plain, practical common sense, without pride or prejudice, or the vindictiveness which is inherent in human nature—formulated with the paramount objective of insuring the future peace and security of the Pacific area and of all the countries contiguous

thereto. Seldom if ever will the United States be called upon, in conjunction with allied nations, to face and to deal with a problem of more momentous import to the future welfare of our country and of the world.

I spoke a moment ago of armchair theorists, and this reminds me of a story told by an American businessman who had lived in Japan, representing a prominent American firm, for some 40 years. During my stay in Tokyo he was called home by his company for consultation. The president and vice presidents of the firm were gathered around the table. "Now, Mr. So-and-so", said the president, "please tell us what Japan is going to do." "I don't know", replied the agent. "What?" thundered the president; "After we have paid your salary for 40 years to represent us in Japan, you have the face to tell us you don't know?" "No," said the agent, "I don't know. But ask any of the tourists; they'll tell you." That anecdote, which was confirmed to me a few days ago by the businessman under reference as substantially correct, is more significant than it may seem. Many Americans visit Japan for a few days or weeks or months and come home and write articles or books about the Japanese. But they haven't got to first base in understanding Japanese mentality. The Japanese dress like us and in many respects they live and act like us, especially in their modern business and industrial life. But they don't think as we do, and nothing can be more misleading than to try to measure by Western yardsticks the thinking processes and sense of rationality and logic of the average Japanese and his reaction to any given set of circumstances. We have armchair statesmen galore; we have volumes galore written by Americans who have spent a few weeks or months, or even a year or two, in Japan, yet whose diagnoses and assessments of Japanese mentality and psychology are dangerously misleading. Many of them have observed Japan and the Japanese solely from the vantage point of that international hostelry, the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. We who have lived in Japan for 10 or 20 or even 40 years know at least how

comparatively little we really do know of the thinking processes of the Japanese. But we are at least in a better position to gage those processes and their results than are the "armchair statesmen".

First of all, I know that there are among us today those who advocate building a fence about Japan and leaving her—I have heard the phrase used in that connection—"to stew in her own juice". The thought has been expressed that during the period of her existence as a world power Japan, through the competition of her export trade and her military aggressiveness, has proved to be more of a nuisance and a handicap in world affairs than an asset. Control of Japanese imports, it is said, could be relied upon to prevent rearmament in future.

With regard to the competition of her export trade having been a nuisance, I might merely inquire whether our cotton exporters and our silk importers would share that opinion. In any case, it is open to question whether we should use our military victory to destroy the legitimate and peace commerce of a commercial competitor and thus betray the principles of the Atlantic Charter. As for the nuisance of Japan's military aggressiveness, it is my assumption that our primary and fundamental objective in the eventual post-war settlement with Japan will be the total and permanent elimination of that military cancer from the body politic of Japan.

I myself do not doubt that this major operation can and will be successfully performed and that effective measures can and will be taken to prevent the re-growth of that cancer in future. Otherwise we shall have fought Japan in vain. In any future system of re-education in Japan I visualize, as I have said, a helpful, cooperative, common-sense spirit, devoid of browbeating or vindictiveness, with emphasis laid upon what the Japanese would have to gain by playing the game with the rest of the world and what they would have to lose by recalcitrance. It was always my regret that these things were not more forcibly brought before the Japanese people in the years before Pearl Harbor. I myself did everything in my power in that

direction, but I was a voice crying in the wilderness. The Japanese people were told by the propaganda of their leaders that the United States and Great Britain were crowding them to the wall, intent upon grabbing control of East Asia and cutting Japan off from the raw materials which she needed for her very existence. At times some of the highest Japanese liberal statesmen did everything in their power, even at the constant risk of assassination by the fire-eaters, to bring their country back to a reputable international life, but they failed. That is all water over the dam now. Now we must look to the future.

The question of determining what kind and how much of Japan's industrial equipment should be left to her after the war will require systematic study. The United Nations must be in a position to determine the factories and machinery necessary for the maintenance of a peace economy, and to dispose of the balance as they think wise—through the dismantling of arsenals and dockyards and of heavy industries designed for or capable of the manufacture of implements of war.

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill conferring at Cairo in November of this year declared that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China", adding: "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." The three Chiefs of State also declared that the "three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." And along with these measures, I visualize a grim determination that the Japanese shall make some sort of amends to China and to other countries for the unspeakable acts of brigandage and the barbarous cruelties inflicted upon the innocent people of those countries.

Now to return to the theory that a fence should be built around Japan and that the Japanese should be left "to stew in their own juice". I cannot see any signs of high statesmanship

in such a tenet. Any careful student of international affairs and of history must see at a glance to what such a measure would lead. It would lead to the creation of a festering sore with permanent explosive tendencies—and, as I have said, we do not want festering sores anywhere in the future world for the building of which we and our Allies are fighting and striving today.

But there is another reason why that proposed monastic wall around Japan could lead only to disaster. Up to the restoration in 1868, Japan was exclusively an agricultural country with a population of approximately 25 million people, living chiefly on their rice and vegetables and fish. After the opening of Japan to the world, the Japanese, imitating the West, industrialized the country, importing raw materials, manufacturing goods, and selling the produce in foreign markets. As a direct result of that industrialization the population of Japan grew to some 75 million. If once again Japan is to become a hermit nation, what is to become of that excess population of 50 million souls? They could not possibly support themselves on the meager land subject to cultivation, for in the mountainous terrain and volcanic soil of the Japanese isles, such land is even now worked to the last square foot, and even now the Japanese depend on fertilizer from Manchuria, sugar from Formosa, and supplementary rice supplies from Korea, among other basic commodities. That excess population of 50 million souls—or such part of it as survived the war—would quite simply starve. I doubt if even the most bloodthirsty of our fellow citizens could with equanimity countenance such a situation.

I now refer to the subject of Shintoism. There are really two forms of Shintoism. One is the indigenous *religion* of the Japanese, a primitive animism which conceives of all nature—mountains, rivers, trees, etc., as manifestations of or the dwelling-places of deities. It has only slight ethical content.

The other form of Shintoism is a *cult*. It has but little religious content and has ethical content to the extent that it is designed to support

the idea of the divine origin of the Emperor and ancestor-veneration, and to instil in the subject habits of obedience and subservience to the state. The military leaders of Japan have for long used this aspect of Shintoism to further their own ends and to inculcate in the Japanese a blind following of their doctrines as allegedly representing the will of the Emperor.

But fundamentally Shintoism is the worship of ancestors. The other day I was talking to a well-known American who visited us in Tokyo a few years before Pearl Harbor. He said that before sailing for Japan he had visited his family tomb up in New England where his forebears for several generations back—one of them having been a member of George Washington's Cabinet—were buried. Later he stood before the Japanese national shrine at Ise. He said that he was deeply moved by the scene. He told a Japanese friend of his own feeling when standing before his own family shrine in America and said that that feeling helped him to understand the reverence of those who came to pray at Ise. The Japanese, his face radiant, grasped the American's hand in both of his and said: "You understand."

There are those in our country who believe that Shintoism is the root of all evil in Japan. I do not agree. Just so long as militarism is rampant in that land, Shintoism will be used by the military leaders, by appealing to the emotionalism and the superstition of the people, to stress the virtues of militarism and of war through emphasis on the worship of the spirits of former military heroes. When militarism goes, that emphasis will likewise disappear. Shintoism involves Emperor-homage too, and when once Japan is under the aegis of a peace-seeking ruler not controlled by the military, that phase of Shintoism can become an asset, not a liability, in a reconstructed nation. In his book *Government by Assassination* Hugh Byas writes: "The Japanese people must be their own liberators from a faked religion."

I think we should bear in mind an important historical fact. The attempt in Japan to erect a free parliamentary system was a grim failure.

That attempt was bound to fail because Japan's archaic policy ruled out any possibility of parties dividing over basic political problems which are elsewhere resolved by parliamentary processes. So long as the constitution fixed sovereignty in the Emperor, it was impossible for any party to come forward with the doctrine that sovereignty resided in the people or for another party—in the absence of any such issue—to deny that doctrine. The promulgation of archaic ideas as the fundamental doctrine of the state made impossible any such struggle as that which took place in England between the Whigs and the Tories. Thus, lacking anything important over which party lines could be drawn, Japanese political parties developed into factions grouped around influential political personages, such as Prince Ito and Count Okuma, and, when these men died, second-rate politicians tried to take their place but without success.

When certain constitutional changes are made and the Japanese are given adequate time to build up a parliamentary tradition, Japan will then, for the first time, have an opportunity to make the party system work.

To summarize my thoughts on this general subject of post-war Japan I would put it this way: First of all we must of course by force of arms reduce the Japanese Army and Navy and air force to impotence so that they can fight no further. That, I fear, is going to be a far longer and tougher job than most of our people conceive, for we are, as I have said, dealing with a fanatical enemy. As one American officer put it: "The Japanese soldier fights to die; the American soldier fights to live." To try to predict even an approximate date for the total defeat of that enemy seems to me to be senseless. I would not hazard a guess within a period even of years. Time means nothing to the Japanese except as a much-needed asset. They blithely think and talk of a 10- or 50- or 100-year war. What they need is time to consolidate their gains. But when their leaders know beyond peradventure that they are going to be beaten, then I shall confidently look for efforts

on their part to get us into an inconclusive peace. Let us be constantly on guard against such a move, for any premature peace would simply mean that the militaristic cancer would dig in underground as it did in Germany, and our sons and grandsons would have to fight this whole dreadful war over again in the next generation. The Japanese would be clever. They would certainly present the pill in a form to appeal to the American people. But whatever terms they might suggest for any premature peace, it is certain that they will never, until reduced to military impotence, abandon their determination to exert control in East Asia. We must be constantly ready for such a move. We must go through with our war with Japan to the bitter end, regardless of time or losses.

In approaching a peace settlement with Japan we must remember that during the second half of the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th century Japan developed a productive power comparable to that of many Western powers; that the rewards of this increased production were not distributed to the Japanese masses but were diverted to the building up of armaments; and that thus the failure of the Japanese people to obtain a more abundant life was not due to lack of economic opportunity but to the aggressive aims of their leaders. The Japanese, notwithstanding the advantages of propinquity to the nations of Asia, did not want to trade on a basis of open competition with other powers but wanted to create exclusive spheres in which their military would be in charge. No wonder that Japanese penetration and development abroad were viewed with suspicion, and efforts made to resist them. In the light of our past experience, in the post-war world Japan can only be taken back as a respectable member of the family of nations after an adequate period of probation. When and as Japan gives practical evidence of peaceful intentions and shows to our complete satisfaction that she has renounced any intention of resuming what Japanese leaders refer to as a 100-year war will we be safe in relaxing our guard. When and as Japan takes concrete steps

along the paths of peace, then there will be found opportunities for extending to Japan helpful cooperation. All this, however, is so far in the future that we cannot undertake now the laying down of a definite policy.

One more point I should like to make and that is this: In victory we must be prepared to implement the principles for which we are fighting. To allow our attitude as victors to be dominated by a desire to wreak vengeance on entire populations would certainly not eliminate focal points of future rebelliousness and disorder. And perhaps even more important would be the effect which such an attitude would generate in time, among the people of the victor nation, possibly in our own children, namely, a profound cynicism with regard to the avowed principles for which we are now fighting.

Before terminating this soliloquy I would like to quote passages from three well-known authorities: First Hillis Lory, whose book *Japan's Military Masters* I consider one of the soundest works that has been written on that subject; second Sir George Sansom, long a member of the British Embassy in Tokyo and one of the world's most eminent writers and experts on Japan; and third, Hugh Byas, a resident in Japan for many years and long correspondent of the *New York Times* in Tokyo. With both Sansom and Byas I maintained close relations during my own stay in Japan, and on most issues in the Far East we saw eye to eye.

Lory writes:

"An appalling blunder in our thinking is the widespread belief that time is with us. On the contrary time is with Japan. It may seem almost inconceivable to many that Japan could possibly compete seriously with us in our war production. But what is there to prevent this? The Japanese have the raw materials. They have the manpower that can be trained. We have no monopoly on mass production. Japan, even in conquered areas, is adapting it to her needs. Japan's most urgent need is time. That we must not give her.

"The longer she has to entrench herself in her conquered territories, the more formidable

will be the military task of dislodging her. The longer she has to utilize her rich booty of war—the tin, the copper, the iron, her vast supplies of oil and rubber; the longer she has to lash the whip over the masses of China, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines—labour that transforms these raw materials into guns and planes and tanks and ships, the longer must be the years of terrible fighting with its cost of American dead to defeat Japan.

"Every Japanese knows that now they are in to win all or lose all. This war is literally a life-and-death struggle. If Japan wins, no nation on earth can successfully challenge her."

In a paper read to the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Canada in December 1942, Sansom, speaking personally and not officially, summed up his thesis in the following words:

"I believe that the past social and political history of the Japanese have produced in them as a nation a remarkable incapacity to grasp the essentials of cultures other than their own, which accounts for their failure to take over, with the physical apparatus of Western Civilization, anything beyond the most superficial aspects of its moral elements. I do not see how this is to be broken down except by increased association between Japanese and people of other nations, and I have to admit that the facts of geography and international politics are unfavourable to that process. Yet, unless this difficulty is somehow overcome, the prospects of a useful contribution by Japan to postwar reconstruction and reform are poor indeed. An outlawed Japan, even weakened to the point of despair, cannot be other than a danger, a kind of septic focus.

"I therefore see no escape from the conclusion that, in their own interests, the United Nations must after the war endeavour to enlist the collaboration of Japan in their projects for security and welfare in the Pacific area. I cannot suggest specific and positive methods, because it is too early to envisage the state of affairs at the end of the war, the relative military and

economic strengths of the combatants and the state of mind of their peoples. But I do believe that an attempt by the victors to prescribe the form or the content of Japanese domestic policy would make their task, already difficult enough, impossible of execution.

"Similar difficulties are likely to arise out of plans to dictate to Japan reforms in her system of domestic government. They are likely to engender more antagonism than agreement. The important thing is not so much that the Japanese should be told to abolish distasteful features of their system as that they should have some positive notions of what to put in their place.

"The liberal democracies now fighting Japan have reason to be proud of their past political history and of the freedoms which they have gained; but we are most of us now agreed that our political philosophies are due for some drastic revision. It is only under the strain of war that we begin to realize that the liberty of the individual citizen has its essential counterpart in his obligations. We find that our enemies, who are not by our standards—or by any standards, for that matter—free men, are able to gain victories which, making all allowance for their material strength, depend in no small measure upon a militant faith. It is, we believe firmly, a mistaken, heretical faith, and its tenets are propounded by its leaders in the language of lunacy. But beneath all the mystical rubbish, the mumbo-jumbo of the master race, the special position in the universe, the divine mission and suchlike foolishness, there is a core of genuine sentiment, a strong feeling of national unity and national purpose in a society where men's duties are felt to be more important than their rights.

"Unless at the end of the war the Japanese are in a state of helpless despair, and ready to follow any strong lead, they are not likely to adopt a ready-made 'way of life' of Western pattern which does not offer better prospect of reconciling rights and duties throughout the community than does our own peace-time system of liberal democracy. They will, I feel

sure, for better or worse work out their own system by trial and error upon the basis of their own traditions.

"I do not venture to hazard a prediction, but I should not be surprised if, in favourable conditions, they developed a more modern and democratic type of constitutional monarchy; and I am interested to find that Dr. Hu Shih, for whose judgment I have great respect, thinks that this is not unlikely."

Byas, in his admirable book *Government by Assassination*, writes:

"Japan's spiritual malady is the same as Germany's—a false philosophy. It is a belief that the Japanese race and state are one and the same and that it has unique qualities that make it superior to its neighbors and give it a special mission to perform . . .

"This false philosophy has been so sedulously inculcated and so eagerly swallowed that at last a policy of live and let live, a position of equality, and a willingness to compromise seem intolerable humiliations. The only position Japan will consider is that of overlord and protector of East Asia. . . .

"For our own future and not for that of Japan we must continue the war until the Japanese forces have been driven from the regions they have invaded. Yet in saving ourselves we are saving the Japanese people. The false philosophy they have taken to their heart will never be discredited until it comes back to them in defeat, humiliation, and loss. Peace without victory, if we accepted it, would be to them a mere cloak to save our face. They would readily join in the fraud for the benefits it would bring them, but the whole false morality which underlies their policy would be reinforced, and their gains would be the jumping-off place for fresh wars. . . .

"The Japanese people must be their own liberators from a faked religion and a fraudulent Constitution. But our victory will start the process and help it along. It will cure them of the illusion that aggression pays and it will open wide a better way to their reascent national energies. . . .

"We want the Japanese people to recognize the war for what it was—a bloody and useless sacrifice to false gods. . . .

"We are laying the foundations of a new order which we conceive to be suited to the modern world in which we live. The riches of the earth will be freely and fairly open to all nations, and the primitive or backward or simply weak peoples will have the protection of an authority representing civilized humanity instead of being left to the chance that may give them a mild or a harsh taskmaster.

"If we consider fifty years of modern Japan and not the gangster decade alone, we are entitled to believe that Japan has qualities that will again fit it to be a member of this new order. Japan is now possessed by the evil genius that it loves, but there is another Japan and it has a contribution to make to the world. . . .

"We want to live in peace and devote our energies to our own well-being. We want to start on the tremendous task of adjusting our lives to a civilization of abundance. We want to raise the level of subsistence and to create economic security for all and on that founda-

tion to erect a free universal culture such as the world has not seen.

"In that order there can be a place for Japan."

ENEMY BROADCASTS ALLEGING RECOGNITION BY SPAIN OF THE MUSSOLINI REGIME

[Released to the press December 31]

The Department of State, on hearing the German and Italian Fascist broadcasts that Spain had recognized the Mussolini regime, immediately instructed the American Ambassador at Madrid to inquire of the Spanish Government whether these reports were true.

The American Ambassador at Madrid has replied as follows: A high official of the Spanish Foreign Office has stated that the German and Italian broadcasts which alleged recognition by Spain of the Mussolini regime are flagrant lies and that the Government of Spain has not recognized and has no intention of recognizing the Mussolini regime. This Foreign Office official described the broadcasts in question as propaganda designed to create difficulties between Spain and the United Nations.

American Republics

RESOLUTION REGARDING RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENTS INSTITUTED BY FORCE

[Released to the press December 27]

The English text of a telegram to the Secretary of State from Dr. Alberto Guani, President, Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, follows:

MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY,
December 24, 1943.

I have the honor of transmitting to Your Excellency the text of the recommendation approved this date by the Emergency Consultative Committee for Political Defense:

"WHEREAS:

"(a) That notwithstanding the lack of success in its purposes of annulling the contribution which the American peoples are making to the war effort and to the political defense of the continent, in compliance with the agreements in effect, it is evident that the Axis continues to exert itself to carry out these designs, with grave danger that totalitarian elements may through force take possession of governments of American Republics, separating them from the principles of union and solidarity adopted

in the face of the common enemy and from support to the cause of the United and Associated Nations;

"(b) That rights and duties are derived from the aforementioned agreements which consecrate the solidarity which should exist between said Republics for the defense of the continent against the dangers indicated in the preceding paragraph;

"(c) That the third consultative meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in creating this Committee, assigned to it the mandate of recommending measures with respect to the problems relating to all aspects of the defense of the continent against the political aggression of the Axis;

"The Emergency Consultative Committee for Political Defense

"RESOLVES:

"To recommend to the American Governments which have declared war on the Axis powers or have broken relations with them, that for the duration of the present world conflict they do not proceed to the recognition of a new government instituted by force, before consulting among themselves for the purpose of determining whether this government complies with the Inter-American undertakings for the defense of the continent, nor before carrying out an exchange of information as to the circumstances which have determined the establishment of said government."

"In communicating said resolution and by express provision of the Committee, I have the particular honor to express that it does not refer to any particular case, but has been adopted having in view the general interests of continental political defense."

I greet Your Excellency with my highest and most distinguished consideration.

ALBERTO GUANI

The Secretary of State on December 27 sent the following reply to Dr. Guani:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's telegram of December 24 transmitting the text of a resolution approved by the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense on December 23 in which it resolved:

"To recommend to the American Governments which have declared war on the Axis powers or have broken relations with them, that for the duration of the present world conflict they do not proceed to the recognition of a new government instituted by force, before consulting among themselves for the purpose of determining whether this government complies with the Inter-American undertakings for the defense of the continent, nor before carrying out an exchange of information as to the circumstances which have determined the establishment of said government."

I desire to inform you that this Government wholeheartedly approves of the foregoing resolution. In accordance with it, this Government stands ready to consult and exchange information with the other American Republics which have declared war against or have severed diplomatic relations with the Axis, in situations to which the resolution applies.

CORDELL HULL

General

NEW YEAR MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press December 31]

The Secretary of State, in reply to a correspondent's question whether he had in mind a New Year message to the American people, made the following statement:

"We have just ended a year which shook our Axis enemies to their very foundations and which witnessed on our side an upsurge of united power that will carry us to victory. Our confidence in victory must, however, be dependent on the unremitting and all-embracing efforts of every man and woman."

Treaty Information

AUTOMOTIVE

Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic

[Released to the press December 31]

On December 31, 1943, the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State and representative of the United States of America on the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, signed in his office the Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic.

The convention was opened for signature at the Pan American Union on December 15, 1943 and was signed on that date by the representatives of nine of the American republics, namely, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Peru.

The convention contains a preamble and 22 articles, with 2 annexes. In general, the provisions are designed to stimulate and facilitate motor travel between the countries of this hemisphere by simplifying certain formalities so far as practicable. The convention establishes certain uniform rules for international automotive traffic, in relation to such matters as registration, driving licenses, standards of size and equipment, and the keeping of records of international automotive traffic.

It is provided in article XIX that the convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French shall be opened for signature by the American republics, and also that it shall be opened for the adherence and accession of American states which are not members of the Pan American Union. It is provided in article XX that the convention shall be ratified in conformity with the respective constitutional procedures of the signatories, the instruments of ratification to be deposited with the Pan American Union. Article XXI provides that the convention shall come into force between the parties in the order in which they deposit

their respective ratifications. Article XXII provides that the convention shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by any party, so far as such party is concerned, by means of one year's notice given to the Pan American Union.

The convention was signed for the United States subject to a reservation with respect to article XV. Article XV provides that each government may establish requirements deemed necessary to record the passage of vehicles and operators into and out of its territory and that, if such records be maintained, they shall include a notation that the vehicle has complied with certain provisions of the convention relating to standards of size and equipment. The reservation indicates that nothing in article XV shall be construed to require the use of personnel and facilities for the purpose of determining compliance with such provisions whenever, in the opinion of the competent authorities, there would result an impairment of essential services or an undue hindrance to the movement of automotive traffic into and from the territory of the United States. This reservation is consistent with article IV of the convention, which provides that the contracting states shall not allow to be put into effect customs measures which will hinder international travel.

MILITARY AND NAVAL MISSIONS

Agreement With Iran

The American Legation at Tehran has transmitted to the Department of State with its despatch 748 of December 1, 1943 the signed originals in English and Persian of a military-mission agreement between the United States and Iran, signed at Tehran November 27, 1943 by Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., American Minister at Tehran, and Mohammed Saed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.

This agreement, which was concluded in conformity with the request of the Government of Iran, is made effective as of October 2, 1942 and will continue in force for two years, but may be extended beyond the two-year period

by mutual agreement of the two Governments.

The purpose of the military mission to which the agreement relates is to advise and assist the Ministry of Interior of Iran in the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. The agreement contains provisions similar in general to provisions contained in agreements between the United States and a number of the other American republics providing for the detail of officers of the United States Army or Navy to advise the armed forces of those countries.

The Department

RESIGNATION OF THOMAS BURKE AS CHIEF OF DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

[Released to the press December 30]

The Secretary of State has sent the following letter to Mr. Thomas Burke, who for the past five and a half years has been Chief of the Division of International Communications and who has resigned that position in order to enter private business.

DECEMBER 30, 1943.

DEAR MR. BURKE:

I have received your letter of December twenty-first tendering your resignation as Chief of the Division of International Communications effective upon the termination of such leave of absence to which you may be entitled.

I very much appreciate the splendid services which you have rendered during the past five and a half years. I recognize, however, the force of the reasons which have led you to conclude that you should transfer your activities to another field and I therefore accept your resignation with regret, to be effective at the close of business on April 28, 1944, and I authorize you to take leave of absence to begin at the close of business on December 31, 1943.

With best wishes for your future happiness and success, I am

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

Publications

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Health and Sanitation Program: Agreement Between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Ciudad Trujillo June 19 and July 7, 1943. Executive Agreement Series 346. Publication 2032. 6 pp. 5¢.

Military Service: Agreement Between the United States of America and Czechoslovakia—Effectuated by exchanges of notes signed at Washington April 3, 1942 and September 29 and October 21, 1943; effective September 29, 1943. Executive Agreement Series 341. Publication 2037. 6 pp. 5¢.

Military Aviation Mission: Agreement Between the United States of America and Paraguay—Signed at Washington October 27, 1943; effective October 27, 1943. Executive Agreement Series 343. Publication 2038. 10 pp. 5¢.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1944

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
Price, 10 cents - - - Subscription price, \$2.75 a year

PUBLISHED WEEKLY WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET